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Introduction
Amidst XIX century, Principality of Serbia was still a country of small 
landowners with 73% of territory dedicated to agriculture, divided into 
fiefs up to 5 hectars in size. Owing to her geographic position, Serbia was 
simultaneously a transit area for trade caravans coming from South and Central 
Balkans as well as for those travelling from outhwest via N. Pazar. Therefore, 
trade has always played a rather important, vital role in development of the 
Principality of Serbia. hence, thriving and ever richer class of merchants 
quickly supported passing the Trade Bill for Principality of Serbia with 
authorisation of “Miloš Obrenović the First Serbian Principal along with 
agreement of the Council following proposal of the National Assembly” 26th 
of January 1860 A. D. The fact that this bill had been passed three years ahead 
of the Austrian and full fifteen years before hungarian Trade Bill is definitely 
noteworthy (Niketić, 1923, pp. 147). Serbian Trade Bill strongly drew from 
the French Code Commerce, especially in articles regarding establishment and 
day to day functioning of business entities, but also from the Civil Code of the 
Principality of Serbia (brought about 1844) whose author was Jovan hadžić 
(Đorđević, 2008, pp. 62-84).
The very passing of the Trade Bill for the Proncipality of Serbia indicated 
gradual build-up of political atmosphere which enabled breakthrough of fresh 
ideas in all aspects of social life. So, for instance, backed by §38 of the Trade 
Bill, in February 1869 Ministry of Finance issued licence for founding the first 
private money fund in Serbia. The First Serbian Bank was projected to start 
with capital of one million ducats. Nevertheless, once opened for business, 
on the 2nd of October 1869, it turned out that it’s IPO managed to amass only 
120,000 ducats (1,440,000 French francs at the time) [Mitrović, 2004, pp. 33].
As it happened, legislation in the Trade Bill was insufficient for establishment 
of such complex business entities. Therefore, already in 1871 not only its 
shareholders went bankrupt, but also its creditors and the state itself - demise 
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having been speeded up by the bank’s attempt to act both as a comercial bank 
and engage in a purely speculative investment.
Bankrupcy of the First Serbian Bank was an important if stressful financial 
experience for the young Serbian state. The downfall of Prva Srpska bank was 
an important financial experience for young Serbian State. That is supported 
by the fact that in 1871 during incorporation of first joint-stock banks with 
domestic capital (Beogradski kreditni zavod, Smederevska kreditna banka i 
Pozarevacka banka) the State decided to enact special decrees, specifying their 
activities, as well as their rights and responsibilities. Given that in number 
of existing provisions of Serbian commercial law relating to incorporation of 
public companies (31-38, 41 and 44) there had been no provisions sanctioning 
unconscionable business dealings, it was decided that a special Decree on 
trading of banks dated 24 September 1871 will in its first provision state that 
‘false creation as well as imitation of any document which the mentioned 
institutions would issue, will be punishable equally as false creation or imitation 
of public documents. During following years, until creation of Privilegovana 
Narodna banka 1884, apart from the mentioned three, only four additional 
(mainly local) banks were formed with the total founding capital of modest 3.2 
million dinars.
On the other hand, until the beginning of the 1880s, Serbia did not have 
either a private or a public financial institution for poorest classes of tradesmen 
and craftsmen. The only source of loan capital was loanshark capital from rich 
city tradesmen and high public servants. As well as Serbian peasants, small 
tradesmen and craftsmen used to paid yearly interest to loansharks between 
24% and 50%, with lower amounts on short term carrying a yearly interest of 
up to 120%. The Serbian authorities on number of occasions attempted to create 
publicly managed funds to address the issues of lending and loansharking, 
mostly without success. The more serious attempt of the State to secure lending 
capital for public was the creation of the Funds Directorate at the Ministry of 
Finance, in 1862 commencing with work in 1864. Funds Directorate provided 
long term loans with 6% annual interest by taking a mortgage over up to 50% 
of estimated value of immovable property. Tradesmen and craftsmen could 
grant a mortgage over their houses and land, which meant that loans were 
available only to relatively better off tradesmen and public servants.
Newspaper “Belgrade Daily” (“Beogradski dnevnik”) wrote in 1882: “It 
is known to every Belgrader that money is very scarce. however, our people, 
as everywhere else, often need money. What happens? Richer tradesmen and 
capitalists easily help themselves, as in case of need, on their land and on their 
signatures, they secure money with moderate interest. What happens when a 
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poorer tradesman, craftsman or a public servant gets into the financial need? 
What? Let’s be honest and say the truth: less well-off class can only turn to 
loansharks, who, seeing him in the need, fleece his skin off, charging 20, 30, 
40, often 50% interest. What is the consequence of that? That class becomes 
overindebted and goes under” (Aleksić, 2012, pp. 108-133).
Legal regulation of joint-stock companies
Incorporation of Privilegovana Narodna Banka kraljevine Srbije 1884 
created the conditions for trading in securities, providing a stimulus to trade 
and resulting in more dynamic development of other commercial areas.
Its incorporation represented a big turning point and a strong momentum 
in development of Serbian entrepreneurship. Significantly increased financial 
funds created the conditions for more dynamic credit dealings, resulting in 
creation of as many as 62 financial institutions. Modest provisions on ‘no-
name corporate bodies’of Serbian Commercial Law (1860) could no longer 
satisfy the growing need for regulatory overhaul of join-stock companies in 
Serbia. Due to turbulent political situation, only the appointment of Nikola 
Pašić аs the Serbian Prime Minister in 1889, securing for his party two key 
government ministries, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the political preconditions were created for passing of the Law on Joint-Stock 
Companies (Aleksić, 2012, p. 116).
The lawmakers found a special inspiration in the provisions of the 
hungarian Trade Law (1875) as well as supplements to the French Trade Law 
(1867). With respect to provisions dealing with composition and creation of 
shareholder meetings, quorum and shareholders’ powers, the Serbian Law 
was more advanced and more complete than hungarian and Austrian trade 
laws that basically had no reference to shareholders’ meetings. On the other 
hand, borrowings from the French Law have not been successful enough as 
the Serbian Law was criticized for having too many provisions and very few 
sanctions, creating a risk that the rendered without effect (Zebić, 1928, p. 7).
During the following two years after the Law on Joint-Stock Companies 
came into force, it became obvious that certain provisions need to further 
elaborate while certain provisions need to be deleted. The Law dated 17 
November 1898 deleted the two contentious provisions (7 and 55) that had 
previously caused a heated debate in the Parliament. Article 7 stipulated that 
foreigners may participate in formation of a joint-stock company, however 
provided that foreigners do not comprise more than one quarter of total number 
of founding members. This effectively meant that Serbia does not allow 
© Filodiritto Editore - Proceedings
45
formation of foreign joint-stock companies on its territory.
Sima Lozanic, Serbian Minister of Economy at the time, urged Serbian 
MPs to repeal the provision, stating that ‘foreign capitalists will not allow 
for somebody else to govern their business dealings’. Article 7 proved as 
unhelpful, as joint-stock companies in some important areas of commerce (that 
needed were in the need of further improvement) never came to be established 
(Zebić, 1928, p. 22). After the Parliament repealed Article 7, it was left to the 
Minister of Finance to estimate how many foreign founding members there 
can be among founding members of a joint-stock company.
While repealing Article 7 made way for unhindered entrance of foreign 
capital into Serbia, repealing Article 55 proved to be disastrous for many joint-
stock companies. Namely, this provision of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies 
prohibited members of executive and supervisory boards (as well as officers) to 
take out loans from its own financial institutions. Minister of Finance Lozanic, 
as well as prominent politician Pera Todorovic, tirelessly insisted to prove 
that repealing this Article would be very dangerous as it would prejudice the 
position of small investors who are in greater need of credit and who would 
have much more difficulties in obtaining loans if rich individuals from the board 
would keep bigger credit amounts to themselves. however, the government 
majority from the Radical party was of the view that the boards are comprised 
of ‘persons with money and integrity’ and if they are excluded ‘there is nobody 
else to guarantee to a financial institution’ (Zebić, 1928, p. 81). Repealing the 
article proved fatal for many joint-stock companies.
Essentially, this laid foundations for false payments of capital, considering 
that members of executive and financial boards were simultaneously opening 
their savings accounts. As many people in Serbia wanted to obtain cheap loans 
of the National Bank of Serbia, they were forming joint-stock companies with 
minimal capital, increasing the prevailing lack of confidence towards joint-
stock companies.
In the period from passing of the Law until the WWI, 270 joint-stock 
companies were formed, out of which 255 banks and only 4 trading, industrial 
or insurance companies. It is clear that even the system of previous consent by 
the Minister of Economy, mandated by the Law on Joint-Stock Companies did 
not influence the formation of such a large number of new banks.
Until 1914, it was required that founding capital for banks in Belgrade is at 
least 500,000 dinars, in other cities in Serbia 200,000 dinars and for banks in 
small towns 100,000 dinars. This capital needed to be paid no later than two 
years from incorporation of a company (Zebić, 1935, pp. 4-5). It is apparent that 
the new State striving to catch up to economically more developed neighboring 
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countries easily consented to formation of joint-stock companies, due to which 
many provisions of this otherwise exceptional law remained as ‘on paper only’ 
black letter law.
The problem of regulating operations of financial-credit institutions 
appeared soon after the end of WWI and formation of the kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (ShS). It turned out that companies in the new State 
operate on the basis of different laws on joint-stock companies. Serbia had 
the mentioned Law on Joint-Stock Companies (1896) with amendments from 
1898. The application of this law extended to Montenegro in 1922.
On former territories of the Austro-hungarian monarchy, special trade laws 
applied, within which existed provisions on joint-stock companies.
In Slovenia and Dalmatia, Austrian Trade Law (1863) was in force, while 
hungarian Trade Law (1875) was applied in Croatia and Vojvodina – also in 
force with minor amendments in Bosnia and hercegovina since 1883 (Aleksić, 
2002, pp. 31-36). That is the reason why the Ministerial Council of ShS in 
November 1919 rendered a decision that all joint-stock companies that are 
formed or expand their business activities over the whole territory of ShS shall 
obtain the consent of Ministry of Trade and Industry (Official Gazette of the 
ShS kingdom, 1919, p. 161).
This decision was in 1922 the basis for adoption of the Law on formation 
of joint-stock companies in Croatia, Slavonia, Banat, Bačka and Baranja when 
the formation of all joint-stock companies was conditional upon the Ministry’s 
consent and oversight. The Ministry issued special permits in cases where 
joint-stock companies were affiliates of foreign companies or banks (kohn, 
1937, p. 16).
Implementing the system of prior consent by the Ministry which was already 
in place in some parts of the country was of crucial national interest with respect 
to protecting development of ShS economy. Immediately after the war ended 
in Croatia and Vojvodina (where the system of prior consent did not exist) a 
large number of foreign companies appeared. These companies were forming 
small joint-stock companies with minimal initial capital of only 25,000-30,000 
dinars. This was the case of foreign company branches with the façade of a 
domestic company that exclusively selling foreign goods and endangering 
business operations of many reputable domestic companies. hence the system 
of prior consent was the first successful undertaking in harmonization of ShS 
legal framework with respect to joint-stock companies.
however, the following stages of this large and significant process were not 
implemented neither swiftly not with ease. The next change did not occur until 
1930, with passing of the Law on Amendments to Joint-Stock Companies Law 
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dated 10 December 1896, addressing harmonization of shareholders’ voting 
rights (Official Gazette of kingdom of yugoslavia, 1930). In ShS joint-stock 
laws excluding Serbia and Montenegro there was a provision that each share 
equals one vote and that there are no limitations with respect to number of 
votes.
In Serbia and Montenegro Articles 65-66 provided that three shares provided 
one vote, under the condition that no shareholder is allowed to have more than 
ten votes, irrespective of number of shares. Considering these provisions in the 
light of time when this Law was passed, these provisions served an economic 
and political purpose.
This primarily served to protect interests of small shareholders, as provisions 
of the law prevented a joint-stock company from becoming a mere formality 
with dominant interests of large shareholders taking precedence. Also, joint-
stock companies were forced to have greater number of shareholders whose 
controlling function in that sense was much more serious, hence information on 
business dealings were more transparent. however, even during the kingdom 
of Serbia period, large shareholders were forced to adjust holdings of its 
shares by introducing fictitious shareholders, so to secure influence (National 
Welfare, 1930, p. 6). Thus public falsifying of the shareholders’ will was 
committed, although according to the Law on Joint Stock Companies, Article 
65 stipulated that if such irregularities are established, the work of shareholders 
can be cancelled, the aggrieved shareholders may file a criminal complaint for 
damages and the members of the board who knowingly allow this kind of 
forgery can be punished with prison sentences of up to 5 years and fines up 
to 10 thousand dinars. however, according to the respected journal National 
interwar economic prosperity “this was something taken for granted, so life 
was broke this unreasonable regulation and made it impossible, outdated and 
a hindrance to development”. But this resulted in difficulties and often drove 
scrupulous people away from joint stock companies. however, Articles 65 
and 66 of the Act at the same time were very troublesome for entry of foreign 
capital in Serbian joint stock companies as well. Foreign representatives are 
not able to and did not want to deal with fixing up so not be outvoted by a small 
minority. Therefore, they are looking for 100% of the shares in one company, 
or otherwise do not want to enter. This prevented cooperation of foreign and 
domestic capital (Ibidem). The problem has become even more evident with 
the establishment of a new, larger country in which more and more foreign 
capitalists, in order to avoid this kind of legislation, instead of Belgrade, 
established its joint-stock companies in Zagreb. After years of appeals by 
certain Serbian economists and businessmen to amend these provisions of the 
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Law on joint stock companies, that was finally done in 1930.
In this way two significant changes were made, the first of which was that 
each shareholder has the right and impact on current work and existence of a 
stock company in proportion to his participation in shareholder equity, while 
the other was that each shareholder may at Shareholders’ meeting represent 
number of shareholders. This was another important step towards harmonization 
of legislation on joint stock companies in the kingdom of yugoslavia.
Encouraged by this new endeavor to harmonise national legislation on joint 
stock companies, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in charge of banking-
credit operations of financial institutions in the country, took measures for the 
adoption of a special law on banks, which would legally regulate their work. 
however, due to the great crisis of the yugoslav banking since 1931, as a result 
of severe credit crisis which at that time prevailed in Germany and Austria, this 
law was never enacted.
Association of banks and development of serbian enterpreneurship
Association of banks Belgrade was founded 4. XII 1921 at initiative of 
bankers from and owners of three biggest financial intermediaries of that time: 
Turnover bank (Serbian: Prometna banka), Export bank (Serbian: Izvozna 
banka) and Belgrade credit institute (Serbian: Beogradski kreditni zavod).
Thus, the chair of the Governing and Executive boards became none other 
than CEO of Turnover bank Mihailo Dragićević. It had been decided that 
management should name two vice-presidents: Milan Stojadinović, PhD, at 
the moment CEO of English merchant bank (Serbian: Engleska trgovinska 
banka), who practicaly supported interests of shareholding banks with foreign 
capital within the Association, while Radivoje Glumac, as CEO of the 
Belgrade-based subsidiary of the First Croatian savings bank (Serbian: Prva 
hrvatska štedionica), was supposed to shield interests of Vojvodina’s monetary 
funds. The two of them were simultaneously members of the Executive board, 
together with CEO of Export bank Vlada T. Marković, PhD and CEO of 
the Meet industry bank (Serbian: Mesarska banka) Nikola Stanarević. The 
founders apparently had similar motives in regard to choosing Governing and 
Supervisory board.
hence, Mihailo Gutman, Solomon Baruh and Bencion Aron were elected as 
representatives of Jewish financial capital (Aleksić, 2011, pp. 70-94). Beside 
them, as the most respectful members, appointed were Jezdimir Đokić, CEO 
of the Belgrade credit institute, Rudolf Pilc, CEO of the Franco-Serbian bank 
and not least unavoidable Luka Ćelović, long time president of the Belgrade 
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cooperative and the wealthiest man in Serbia. Luka was considered very well 
versed in financial circumstances of the day while his political connections in 
the newly formed state were especially valuable to young Association of banks 
(Spomenica, 1931, pp. 84-95).
Although the work of the Association of Banks Beograd was mostly reflected 
by mediation between the joint-stock banks and various state authorities 
including the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance and 
Justice and the National Bank of kJ, its great achievement, especially during 
the first ten years of work, was a successful appeal to all Serbian banks for the 
subscription of new 40 thousand shares of the National Bank of the kingdom 
of ShS. The National Bank announced the subscription of new shares in 1920 
but the response was extremely weak.
After the appeal of the Association in February 1922, after only a month, all 
share of the National Bank were paid. Also, by its intercession the Intelligence 
credit bureau at the National Bank of kJ was formed, followed by passing of 
the Law on Promissory Notes. In 1929, again due to its appeal to financial 
institutions, the subscription of shares of the newly established Privileged 
Agrarian Bank kJ was completed in a quite short period of time.
The Association had also offered its interpretation of the draft law on: direct 
taxes, fees, forced settlement, the industrial bonds, Economic Council and 
bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, it actively participated on drafting laws 
on banks and a unified law on joint stock companies of kJ, which as we have 
seen, never came to be adopted (Spomenica, 1931, pp. 69-74). Celebrating in the 
hall of the Belgrade Stock Exchange the tenth anniversary of the Association, 
its then chairman Dr. T. Markovic emphasized very well the mission of the 
association and the importance of developing local entrepreneurship by words: 
“Banks are not the aim and the purpose in themselves, but they have to carry out 
their national economic function. Neither a modern economy can be without 
valid credit institutions, nor can credit institutions improve if the economic 
situation is bad and unhealthy. Therefore, the professional interests of financial 
institutions are identical with the interests of the entire national economy.
One cannot be separated from the other, because only jointly these make 
up one higher economic community of interest”. (Mutual house, 2006, p. 
22) Indeed, pioneers of Serbian banking have recognized from the onset the 
importance of relationship management – and corporate social responsibility 
even – for customer satisfaction index, innovation and marketing of bank 
products, i.e. concepts and methodologies formally developed much later in 
modern banking theory and practice (Vukosavljević et al., 2015).
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Shareholding law and its abuses
In context of analyzing the development of entrepreneurship and parallel 
work on the harmonization of the Law on Joint Stock Companies and its 
adaptation to the spirit of new age , special attention should be paid to the 
analysis of individual efforts of certain interwar economists to point to the 
emergence of ‘bankocracy’ in yugoslavia and Serbian society in general.
Thus, the famous economist Nikola Stanarević in 1924 wrote in the 
prestigious Zagreb magazine “Banking”, that the influence of banks and 
bankers on the policy, or the dependence of politicians on plutocracy is so 
great that it could not have been contemplated ten years. “Banks in Zagreb 
fund daily newspapers and implement their policy here as well. Our ministers, 
former and active, publicly participate in the establishment and administration 
of joint stock companies, even where written laws exist to prohibit that... There 
are ministers who have direct connections, as well as members of management 
boards in a dozen financial institutes and large joint stock companies… Lately, 
there is not one big deal without involvement of a prominent politician, an 
MP or a high state official. Forest and mining companies take gentlemen from 
this sphere, the others turn to influential people of the Board of Funds, state 
monopolies, etc. It seems to me that even in the Management Board of the 
National Bank people come based on a famous pattern agreed between the 
Radicals and the Democrats for seats in the cabinet, including number of police 
officials. The interventions of the MPs, lobbying of the Ministers, engagement 
of the Prime Minister’s relatives on completing business in various government 
departments, all that at the expense of the general interests of the state budget” 
(Stanarević, 1924, p. 398). It turned out that not even the Law on Introduction 
of National Accounting, neither the Law on the Election of Deputies nor the 
Civil Servants Act were able to prevent this. According to him, ‘bankocracy’ 
had a twofold impact. First of all, it worked its way aided by high-ranking 
politicians such as ministers, deputies and high-ranking government officials 
in the boards. With the State’s assistance, they enabled the bankers (in most 
efficient and most convenient way) to finalize leasing transactions of goods, 
removing sequestration or obtaining concessions for best arable or industrial 
land, transport and the like. At the same time, with the assistance of such banks 
and the media influenced by banks, the votes were bought and the voters misled.
There were many proposals on combating this harmful phenomenon in the 
economy and politics of the country. Thus, the Association of Banks in Belgrade 
and Dr. Janko hacin, Director of the First Croatian Savings Bank pointed to 
the need to introduce measures that would allow the credit circumstances, 
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especially in Serbia, be established on a healthier basis, reducing the risks 
and losses of financial institutions an indispensable condition for reduction of 
interest rates on bank loans (hacin, 1929, pp. 6-8).
In fact, due the statutory confidentiality and the National Bank lacking 
control over Serbian joint stock banks, it turned out that many businessmen 
who were left without funds requested and received loans in as many as five or 
more banks simultaneously”. There it suddenly shows that a company, which 
is considered good for 100,000 dinars, enjoyed a loan in that amount not in 
one, but in five, ten and in one case in as many as eighteen banks . And each 
bank had lived in the belief that it is the firm’s only financier” (hacin, 1929, 
pp. 6-8).
To Serbian banks brought in contact with each other in order to successfully 
defend their interests, it was pointed out, for example Ljubljana’s banks that 
are sent every month branch of the National Bank of state obligations to its 
borrowers and from it received reports on the status of their obligations in 
other Ljubljana’s financial institutions. Thanks to these committments, in 1929 
they introduced credit intelligence departments with the National Bank, which 
greatly contributed to the improvement of credit conditions in Serbia.
In order to seriously approach the corruption in Serbian banks it was 
necessary to change the provisions of the Law on Joint Stock Companies of 
1896 (as amended in 1898), which were related to operations control over 
monetary institutions. The fact was that joint stock companies were organized 
in such a manner that shareholders individually had neither legal nor factual 
possibility to control operations of the Boards. Therefore, the only recourse 
left was to rely on the Supervisory Boards, whose members, contrary to the 
practice in developed countries, were elected by the Boards’ members.
Thus a paradoxical situation emerged that instead of the control function 
being exercised by leading experts with most business experience, to the 
Supervisory Boards came those who were “too young and too weak” to be 
on the Boards. Often we find in the Board a father and an uncle and a son or 
a nephew in the Supervisory Board. Particularly for joint-stock banks, we see 
directors in the Boards and in the Supervisory Boards their subordinate officers 
who then should supervise their bosses. This paradox has become such an 
established rule in which we no longer feel the paradox. A request to amend 
this strange, incomprehensible practice will be considered as a paradox (hacin, 
1929, pp. 51-53). however, this practice was changed after full thirty years 
since the adoption of the Law on Joint Stock Companies. New Commercial 
Law of the kingdom of yugoslavia (1937), in addition to the fact that it 
allowed establishment of joint stock companies with limited liability across 
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the country, clearly specified duties and responsibilities of the Supervisory 
Board as the controlling authority. In addition, the Law introduced institution 
of the Commissioner and established external supervision (Tauber, 1933, pp. 
627-629), (Mirković, 1940, p. 52). For many Serbian banks new Commercial 
Law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia came too late, demonstrated by large 
number of insolvencies and forced liquidations, especially in period 1931-
1936. The WWII that started four years later did not leave enough time for this 
legislation to demonstrate its efficiency to the full extent and impact on Serbian 
entrepreneurship.
Conclusion
One of the crucial results of this research is finding that already during the 
mid-XIX century Serbia had not only monetary strength of the wealthiest, but 
also political, economic and intellectual circles which understood importance 
of entrepreneurship in socio-economic development of the state. Early 
appearance of private incorporated banks in Serbia, courtesy of the Trade Bill 
for the Principality of Serbia passed in 1860, represents the case in point.
however, due to the weak accumulation of capital, their financial means 
were insufficient to meet the growing needs of Serbian businessmen. They 
saw the solution in establishing the Privileged National Bank of the kingdom 
of Serbia, as the central credit institute which kept gold and silver in its vaults 
against which fiduciary banknotes in certain proportion were issued. Finally, 
the key role of Serbian entrepreneurs in establishment of the central bank was 
of immense importance for further development of Serbian entrepreneurship 
itself. By issuing paper money in greater quantity of the specie-backed 
equivalent, national bank provided loans at lower interest rates than otherwise 
possible, which soon enough increased domestic capital two to three times.
This in turn led to additional amendments of the Trade Bill to the new 
zeitgeist that brought about explosive growth of private bank corporations.
however, domestic entrepreneurs held the view that for further development 
Serbia required new law on corporate entities instead of amending a long 
outdated Trade Bill. Authors of this law found inspiration in the very best 
European pieces of legislation of that time and made effort to additionally 
enrich it in segments particularly cumbersome for domestic implementation.
Nonetheless, too many rules and acclamations, yet very few sanctions, 
proved to be a serious weakness of this law in times of Serbia’s transition 
into the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. Serbian economic and 
political elite, faced with new, big and relatively well organised goods- and 
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financial markets, at first caught up with new realities rather slow and almost 
involuntary. By limiting its business operations mostly to the territory of what 
was kingdom of Serbia, Serbian entrepreneurial class more or less failed to 
timely address the economic challenges of the day. Those who believed in 
Serbian entrepreneurial potential didn’t hesitate to both point out all the social 
inadequacies and offer good enough corrective prescriptions which were 
gradually deployed through new legal framework. From second half of 1930s 
it seemed that Serbian entrepreneurship finally overcame all challenges of new 
economic space and fierce competition. Ever more organized domestic market 
as well as extraordinarily good governmental trade agreements made possible 
for Serbian entrepreneurship to reach its maximum potential and impact for the 
time being. Alas, WWII and new socialist regime completely annulled several 
decades of entrepreneurial efforts and forced the next generation of Serbian 
enterpreneurs at the turn of the millennium to face the latest transition and start 
all over again.
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